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Abstract 
The popularity of the Internet and the variety of services it provides has been immense. Unfortunately, many of these 
services require the user to register and subsequently login to the system in order to access them. This has resulted in the 
user having to remember a multitude of username and password combinations in order to use the service securely. 
However, literature has clearly demonstrated this is not an effective approach, as users will frequently choose simple 
passwords, write them down, share them or use the same password for multiple systems. This paper proposes a novel 
concept where Internet users authenticate to web services (service providers) by the use of a smartcard – taking away 
any requirement for the user to provide credentials. The smartcard is useful in this context as it is a trusted device that is 
capable of applying cryptography in a tamper resistant environment. The development of the concept is based upon an 
extension to Authentication Authorisation Infrastructure (AAI) models, where a trusted authority (Identity Provider) will 
provide and manage the smart card to end-users. In devices such as mobile phones, a smartcard is already present (e.g. 
the SIM) to facilitate this and it is envisaged such a card could also be produced for desktop environments – similarly to 
what many banks are currently implementing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Internet users have to prove their identity when accessing services or personal information from web services (service 
providers). This authentication is generally achieved through the use of identifiers and passwords. With the emergence of 
the Internet and its substantial popularity, users have to manage a growing numbers of login/passwords which represent 
their identity across different Service Providers (SPs). The management of these is often difficult as the user does not 
remember every identifier associated with each web service. In addition, the use of passwords raises a problem of 
security, with for example having an identity compromised, theft or misused (Schneier, 2004).  Indeed, password 
authentication relies upon the use of a secret knowledge shared between two parties that could be easily disclosed either 
by the user’s behaviour or by a bad implementation of the authentication protocol at the Service Provider. In the first 
case, the user is responsible to protect, manage and update his passwords on a regular basis and to utilize a different one 
for each service (Warren, 2006). However, this is not the case for all users who often write them down on paper or a 
post-it, or just use the same password for every service. As such, Service Providers also have to be careful about the 
implementation of such an authentication technique and the reliability it is assumed to have. In addition, other threats 
such as eavesdropping could also reveal the secret information if the channel between end-user devices is not secured 
(Warren, 2006). Currently, the most frequent form to secure the exchange of credentials is to use the Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) protocol with a server side certificate, but this is not always utilised. Taking this into account, the research has 
proposed a novel approach where a smartcard will be utilised to provide transparent authentication of the user from his 
device. This approach removes any inconvenience for the user in having to remember username and password 
information for each service and provides the opportunity to improve the level of security through using asymmetric 
cryptography. 
 
This paper is organized in five sections, beginning with an overview of smart cards technologies. The paper will then 
proceed to discuss current research in to the area of federated identity, specifically focussing upon the work of Shibboleth 
and Liberty Alliance. The third section provides a detailed description of the novel approach; and the penultimate section 
discusses the overall concept, with a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages. Finally, the conclusions are 
presented in section four. 
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BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
Smartcard Technologies 
By definition, there are different categories of smart cards; passive and active (Scheuermann, 2002). Passive tokens 
simply store a secret that is subsequently presented to an external system for processing validation. Active tokens also 
store a base-secret, but this information is never released to the external system. Instead, the token is capable of 
processing the secret with additional information and presents the result of the verification to an external system. Active 
tokens or cards are built around a microprocessor and relatively small amounts of memory. The cards benefit from a 
highly secure tamper resistant environment which makes it difficult for the contents of the memory to be misused active 
(Scheuermann, 2002). It was due to these very attributes that SIM cards were developed for mobile phones – so that 
network operators would have a trusted relationship between the handset and network. This tamper resistant environment 
built upon a relatively cheap and scalable technology has the potential to be useful in storing other information such as 
user’s web identities. Moreover, with over 3 billion mobile phones in use, a solid foundation for the use of these 
smartcards already exists (GSM Association, 2009). 
 
Therefore, smartcard technologies comply with the defined ISO 7816 standard which describes how this card is produced 
along with the interactions with smartcard readers. However, the deployment of such a strong authentication solution is 
currently very limited as it requires the involvement and interoperability between different Service Providers. As a result, 
the research intends to propose the utilization of the smartcard within a specific framework. The framework is based 
upon current AAI models, where a trusted entity called an Identity Provider (IdP) will be present to provide and manage 
the smart card concept to end-users (Service Providers playing the role of web services). Thus, the next section reviews 
two existing AAIs. 
A Review of Authentication Authorisation Infrastructures  
 
The research chose to review two well-known AAIs: Shibboleth (2009) and Liberty Alliance (2007). 
 
Shibboleth is an Internet 2 project which has developed an open solution to solve the problem of sharing resources 
between different Service Providers. These have their own authentication and authorisation policies which impede 
sharing resources between them. The Shibboleth project chose to develop a novel idea where a home organisation is 
present to authenticate the user in different Service Providers. In addition, the home organisation manages the identity of 
the user. This identity is composed of different attributes which can be disclosed to Service Providers for authentication 
purposes. Consequently, when a user requests an access to a resource stored from a Service Provider, the Service 
Provider sends its attribute rules to the home organisation and the home organisation supplies the necessary information 
back to the Service Provider. The Service Provider then chooses to grant or deny the access to the resource. The 
advantage of such an architecture is that the Service Providers do not have to manage the authentication of the user; this 
task being delegated to the home organisation and authorisation decisions are performed by the Service Provider. 
 
The Liberty Alliance project is a European project which was initiated in 2001. It involves key organisations such as 
France Telecom, British Telecom, Intel, Sun Microsystems amongst others working as a consortium. They cooperate in 
order to write open standards and define requirements to provide federated identity management. By definition, the 
concept of federation allows the user to manage his identity across different Service Providers and to navigate directly 
from Service Provider to Service Provider without the need to re-authenticate (single sign on). This situation is possible 
when Service Providers are part of a circle of trust where an Identity Provider authenticates the user in his federated 
services. Both IdP and SP parties must comply with the Liberty Alliance federation framework in order to function 
across common protocols to exchange their information (DeLooze, 2007).  
 
Whereas Shibboleth is open source software (i.e. released under apache software licence), the Liberty Alliance does not 
provide any software, but releases specification drafts defining abstract protocols and delegating the task of developing it 
practically to organisations which wish to implement the federation framework. 
Integration of Smartcard into the AAI model 
As previously mentioned, within the AAI model, there is an IdP or home organisation (Shibboleth term) which is present 
to authenticate the user and provide the corresponding user’s identity to different Service Providers. These AAIs bring 
two main advantages: the first one is that the authentication of the user is delegated to the Identity Provider and the 
second one is that the Identity Provider knows how to name a user at different Service Providers. 
 
However, the research wants to propose a novel concept, where the user can authenticate directly to Service Providers 
(without depending on authentication at the IdP). This case will be possible (see figure 1) by the use of a smartcard where 
user’s identities at different Service Providers will be downloaded remotely from the Identity Provider into smartcard. 
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This is made possible, primarily due to the trusted nature of the smartcard technology. Once identities are downloaded, 
the user can provide them to Service Providers totally independent of the Identity provider. This enables the reliance 
upon the Identity Provider to provide authentication – representing a possible single point of failure in the system. It also 
reduces the volume of traffic as fewer communications are necessary to complete the transaction and is arguably more 
scalable  from a technology perspective when considering the billions of authentications that might be required daily. 
Consequently, the role of the Identity Provider will change from existing AAIs (Shibboleth and Liberty) from being used 
to verify the authenticity of every user to every service, to a management role that creates the initial trusted relationship. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 -  Smartcard deployment with the AAI model 
 
The following sub-sections introduce several components of the concept, starting with an overview of the Identity 
Provider and Service Provider association which uses an Internet open standard in order to be interoperable. 
Subsequently, the second section provides a description of the smartcard features released to the end users by the Identity 
Provider. The third section illustrates how user's web identities at Service Providers are built, and finally, how the user 
authenticates to Service Providers. 
Identity Provider and Service Providers Association 
 
The research considers that the association between Service Providers and Identity Providers takes place in the context of 
a federated environment. By definition, a federated environment is a set of entities which communicate together with 
common practices and policies in order to exchange information about their users and resources (Maler, 2006). In our 
novel concept, both Identity Providers and Service Providers will have to be interoperable, complying with the same 
methods to exchange information. Furthermore, stakeholders will have to establish trust between each others. 
 
Interoperability: The research has chosen to utilize an Internet open standard called the Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML) produced by the Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS).  In 
reality, SAML is the convergence of work undertaken by Shibboleth and Liberty Alliance project (OASIS, 2004a). By 
definition, this open standard will provide an efficient mechanism to create and exchange information regarding a user at 
a particular Service Provider. 
 
Trust: In the AAI model, we need to establish a trust between different entities. In this case, when the Identity Provider 
produces web identities of the user using SAML assertions, Service Providers will have to trust these assertions. 
According to the trust model guidelines of the OASIS consortium (OASIS, 2004b), trust is established between two axis: 
authentication and business agreements (BA) criteria (see figure 2). Considering the strong authentication solution; the 
research has selected to favour the “Pairwise/Direct” model where Service Providers and Identity Providers have a BA 
and authentication is made by the use of digital certificates and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) technology (OASIS, 
2004b). 
  
 
Internet 
IDP  
network 
Client 
network 
Web service 
A
Web service N
Identity Provider 
1) The user downloads his identities from the IdP 
2) The user authenticates to SPs providing the associated identity 
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Figure 2 - Trust model category [9] 
 
By definition a PKI is an infrastructure where a Certification Authority (CA) allows different entities to establish trust. 
This establishment is achieved through the use of digital certificates issued by a trusted CA. Each Service Provider and 
Identity Provider will exchange their own digital certificate in order to establish trust for a future exchange of SAML 
assertions. 
SAML Assertions 
In the SAML concept, SAML assertions are produced by an SAML authority (Identity Provider) and Service Providers 
are called SAML consumers. By definition, SAML assertions are codified using eXtensible Markup Language (XML) in 
a data structure which contains information about a user. Therefore, these SAML assertions may contain more data, for 
instance; authentication statement, authorisation statements, or advanced attributes about a user (OASIS, 2005a). In our 
case, SAML assertions will be used to create the identity of the user at the corresponding Service Provider. 
 
Typically, when the user desires to use the strong authentication solution for the first time at a particular Service 
Provider, the Identity Provider will provide the assertion data remotely as illustrated in Figure 3. The structure of the 
assertion starts with a unique assertion identifier, an issue instant (the time when this one has been created) and the issuer 
name (i.e. IdP name) followed by the Subject section which then specifies the unique name identifier of the user at the 
Service Provider and the unique name identifier at the Identity Provider. This information is mandatory as the Service 
Provider will identify the user through these name identifiers. 
 
In addition, this section includes a subject confirmation method where the user will have to prove his identity when 
providing the assertion to an Service Provider.  Since assertions will be stored in a smartcard, the research has chosen to 
provide the smart card with a pair of public and private keys and a public key certificate to digitally sign the assertion. 
Consequently, the “subject confirmation method” field will contain the public key certificate of the smartcard.  
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Figure 3 - SAML assertion that will be created by the Identity Provider 
 
Subsequently, the condition field is present to limit the scope of the assertions to one specific Service Provider. Finally, 
the entire SAML assertion is digitally signed by the Identity Provider in order to guarantee the integrity of the assertion. 
As a result, when the assertion is provided remotely into the smartcard, it cannot be modified. 
 
Smartcard Features 
As previously mentioned the smartcard is a secure token capable of storing/processing data and protecting access to it.  
When the smartcard is issued to the end user, part of the memory will be dedicated to store SAML assertions (see figure 
4). In addition, the card will be provided with a pair of public and private keys. The private key will be used in order to 
digitally sign the assertion when authenticating at the Service Providers. As a result, the smartcard will be capable of 
signing the corresponding assertion and will be provided with a cryptographic function in the chip based upon the RSA 
encryption standard. This cryptographic function is defined by the PKCS#1 standard (RSA, 1993). Furthermore, when 
signing messages, the user must have a public key certificate which guarantees that the private key used to sign message 
is bound to his identity. Typically, the public key certificate is issued by a CA and trusted by Service Providers as part of 
the BA with the Identity Provider. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Smart card feature released by the IDP 
 
When initialising for the first time the strong authentication solution at the Service Provider, the user will be redirected to 
the Identity Providers website and this one will provide the SAML assertion remotely on to the smartcard. The following 
time, when the user requests access to his Service Provider, the assertions will come directly from the smartcard rather 
than having to use the Identity Provider. 
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User Authentication to Service Provider 
Once the user’s assertions have been provided to the smartcard, they can be used to authenticate the user to the 
corresponding Service Provider. As mentioned, Service Providers consume SAML assertions and make authorisation 
decisions based on these. The communication with Service Providers is made through the web browser of the user. The 
research supposes that the web browser is able to communicate with the smart card in a secure manner. Thus the 
exchange of these assertions is made by sending XML messages over the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) using the 
Reverse Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) binding (POAS) defined by the SAML standard (OASIS, 2005b). If 
supported by the web browser of the user, this binding allows both parties to exchange SAML assertions. Typically, the 
POAS binding is designed with an authentication request and response protocol where the Service Provider issues an 
authentication request to the user, and the web browser must respond with an authentication response (OASIS, 2005b). 
 
A generic authentication response is illustrated in Figure 4. In this figure, the response made by the web browser contains 
the request identifier of the Service Provider and the issue instant of the request. In addition, the content of authentication 
response contains the corresponding SAML assertion related to the Service Provider. Finally, the entire response 
message is digitally signed by the private key of the smartcard. As mentioned in the previous part, the digital signature is 
mandatory as it provides a mechanism to confirm that the user is the owner of the SAML assertion. 
 
 
 
Figure 5- Authentication response 
 
Once received by the Service Provider, the SAML assertion will have to be checked carefully: firstly, by verifying the 
smartcard’s signature and the validity of the public key certificate of the smartcard, and secondly, by verifying the 
signature and the public key certificate of the Identity Provider. Depending on the result of these checks, the Service 
Provider makes authorisation decisions by granting or denying access to the user. 
 
Currently, the signature of the authentication response by the private key of the smartcard only provides message 
integrity and non-repudiation at the application level. Indeed, security will have to be established as well at the transport 
level in order to guarantee confidentiality when sending authentication request or response. As a result, HTTP messages 
will need to be sent over Secure Socket Layers (SSL) in order to secure the communications path between the client (i.e. 
the web browser) and the Service Provider.  
DISCUSSION 
The research proposes to use a generic smartcard to authenticate the user on his web services utilising part of an existing 
AAI. The proposed system has a number of advantages over existing solutions and these are presented below: 
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Service Provider 
If a service provider wants to offer a strong authentication solution to his customers, he will not have to face the cost of 
deployment of a smartcard solution. Rather through simply establishing a BA with an Identity Provider, the Service 
Provider is able to benefit from that solution. Furthermore, in order to be compatible with the AAI, Service Providers will 
have to comply with SAML, which is an Internet open standard facilitating the interoperability between them and the 
Identity Provider. Development, implementation and management of this should therefore be minimised. 
End-User 
The direct advantage for the end-user is that they benefit from a strong authentication solution to verify identity to their 
various Service Providers. They will not have to remember a different set of logins and passwords, as the smart card will 
contain user’s web identities, thereby minimising user inconvenience and providing a seamless authentication 
mechanism. Furthermore, the smartcard brings advanced security features by confirming web identities with digital 
signatures. 
Identity Provider 
The research favours the deployment of the smartcard component using an Identity Provider. This can be seen as an 
introduction of a new type of Internet service which proposes strong authentication solution to Internet users. Of course, 
this type of service has a cost, but end-users could potentially accept this cost to benefit from a strong authentication 
solution. Moreover, by moving away from the Identity Provider having to authenticate each and every request, smaller 
infrastructure demands are made upon the Identity Provider. In addition, if the existing technology, such as the SIM card 
in a mobile phone, could be harnessed the cost of deployment could be reduced significantly.  
 
Technical Requirements 
The web browser of the users’ device will typically need an extension or plug-in to interact with the smartcard. 
Interacting with this is half the problem; as the web browser will have to communicate with the Identity Provider to get 
the SAML assertions and to communicate with Service Provider for authentication. The research does not indicate how 
to provide the web identity of the user remotely to the smart card. In addition, during the implementation of the solution, 
the plug-in will have to recognise incoming authentication requests from the Service Provider. As a result, the plug-in 
will have to support the POAS binding defined by the SAML open standard .  
 
CONCLUSION 
The research has proposed a concept where a smartcard could be used as a strong authentication technique to authenticate 
the user on his web services. The solution is based upon existing AAI models and identity federation where an Identity 
Provider is present to provide user’s web identities to Service Providers. In the novel concept, these web identities are 
provided remotely into the smartcard by the Identity Provider. These web identities are constructed with an existing open 
standard called SAML in order to guarantee interoperability between different stakeholders. Furthermore, in such an 
architecture, the Identity Provider takes the lead in the deployment of this solution; as a result, Service Providers do not 
have to manage the cost and deployment of the smartcard which is certainly the criterion which impedes the development 
of smart card solutions currently. 
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